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ABSTRACT 
This article uses a comprehensive theoretical framework to explain why parents send money 
to particular children, and examines whether intergenerational solidarity is shaped by 
spending on various welfare domains or provisions as a percentage of gross domestic product. 
The theoretical model at the level of parents and children distinguishes parental resources and 
children’s needs as the most likely factors influencing intergenerational money transfers. 
Differences in spending on various welfare domains is then used to hypothesize in which 
countries children with specific needs should be most likely to receive a transfer. For parents 
we hypothesize in which countries parents with specific resources available should be most 
likely to send a transfer. We use data from the first wave of the Survey of Health and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE) to analyse the influence of welfare-state provisions on the 
likelihood of intergenerational transfers in ten European countries. The results indicate that, in 
line with our expectations, the likelihood of a transfer being made is the outcome of an 
intricate resolution of resources (ability) of the parents and the needs of a child. Rather large 
differences between countries in money transfers are found. Our results suggest however that 
insofar as previous work using distinct welfare state typologies considers money transfers, 
such a clear distinction between typologies is not justified.  
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Introduction 
Much research on cross-national differences in intergenerational monetary transfers from 
parents to their children focuses on the role of welfare regimes, and to distinguish types of 
welfare regimes, Esping-Andersen’s (1990) formulations in Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism are often used.  Observed differences in aggregate levels of support provisions 
have been linked to the types of welfare regimes (Albertini, Kohli and Vogel 2007). 
Intergenerational transfers typically flow from parents to their children, a pattern observed in 
various European countries regardless of the welfare regime (Attias-Donfut, Ogg and Wolff 
2005; Kohli 1999; Kohli and Albertini 2009). Researchers have shown that in southern 
European countries, transfers are higher but less frequent, whereas in Nordic countries they 
are more frequent but lower. Continental European countries take a middle position 
(Albertini, Kohli and Vogel 2007).  Most of the comparative studies of differences in support 
provision between welfare regimes have examined aggregate data without controlling for 
compositional differences among countries. The few studies that have controlled for such 
differences have used parents’ characteristics, such as income, health status and level of 
education, but still found country differences in levels of support (Albertini, Kohli and Vogel 
2007; Attias-Donfut et al. 2005). In these studies the implicit assumption remains that there is 
a link between the welfare system and intergenerational transfers. The models control only for 
country level differences, and do not test the underlying assumptions.  
This paper seeks to go further and to contribute to the literature in three ways. First, 
many studies have not acknowledged the importance of looking at both sides of the parent-
child dyad. The characteristics of both parents and their children are important in determining 
why intergenerational monetary support is provided. Although parents decide on whether or 
not to send money, all their children are potential receivers of support. Intergenerational 
transfers are influenced by social interactions within the family. Considering the 
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characteristics of all family members directly involved, not only those of the parents, should 
therefore give a fuller explanation of why children are financially supported, and which 
factors determine who actually receives the support (Becker 1974). Analyses that have 
considered the attributes of both parties have included the health status of the head of the 
household and other household members as controls, and found that poor health decreases the 
likelihood of support provision, but increased the likelihood of support receipt (McGarry 
1999; Schoeni 1997). Berry’s (2008) more comprehensive analysis included relevant non-
economic factors, but with data for only the United States and the author did not address the 
issue of the influence of the welfare-state regime.  
Second, the clustering of countries into a few types of welfare regimes has limitations, 
most obviously that the differences in national welfare policies within each cluster are hidden, 
when in fact the clusters are far from homogeneous, many countries have idiosyncratic and 
disjointed welfare policies, and the level of similarity depends on the specific welfare field 
(Kasza 2002). A widely-used classification of national welfare regimes distinguished socialist 
(Nordic countries), conservative (continental Europe) and liberal welfare (Anglo-Saxon) 
states (Esping-Andersen 1990), but another cluster representing the Southern European 
countries is required to account for the observed differences in intergenerational transfers in 
families across Europe (Albertini, Kohli and Vogel 2007). Moreover, Esping-Andersen 
(1999) proposed separating France and Belgium from the other conservative countries when 
examining variations in family policies. It is apparent, therefore, that there is no consensus on 
how to categorise welfare regimes.  A recent study of instrumental support between parents 
and children chose not to cluster countries for this reason (Kalmijn and Saraceno 2008). We 
also refrain from using such clusters. 
Third, finding aggregate differences in welfare provision does not explain any 
differences in intergenerational monetary support. An observed difference between countries 
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after controlling for population composition does not irrefutably confirm a welfare-state 
influence. How welfare policies affect intergenerational transfers should be determined by 
testing whether individual monetary support is directly influenced by the welfare state. This 
requires testable hypotheses about how the welfare system influences transfers from parents 
to their children at the micro-level, and about the likelihood of children in different countries 
with different welfare-state provisions receiving transfers at all and of specified values 
(Tesch-Römer and von Kondratowitz 2006).  
We propose a comprehensive theoretical framework that includes the characteristics of 
both parents and child at the individual and dyadic levels. To test the assumed influence of 
welfare regimes, we predict how particular adult children in need may be more likely to 
receive support depending on welfare-state differences. We start from the premise that 
intergenerational monetary transfers are dependent on parental resources, and that monetary 
support is provided if the child has needs. We furthermore incorporate the notion of future 
reciprocity, which is assumed to increase the likelihood of receiving support. Alternative 
expenditure, or circumstances in the parents’ lives that also require spending, are on the other 
hand assumed to decrease the likelihood of support receipt. The unit of analysis is the parents-
child dyad. We assume that transfer decisions are made by the parental couple (when parents 
are still together), not by individual parents. We also assume that specific welfare policies 
affect the degree to which parental resources are used, or in other words how parents respond 
to the needs of their children. The research questions that we have addressed are:  
1. What factors determine whether parents provide monetary support to their children, and 
to what extent do the characteristics of their children influence this decision?  
2. To what extent do differences between countries remain after taking the individual level 
differences into account?  
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3. Do differences in the generosity of welfare provisions influence monetary support from 
parents to children? 
The model 
Needs 
The importance of considering the attributes of both parents and children in monetary 
transfers is stressed in the economics literature by social interaction theory (Becker 1974). 
This assumes that parents are altruistic and therefore concerned with the material or economic 
wellbeing of their children. That concern motivates them to redistribute some of their income 
or assets to their children in need of economic support. Analyses have shown that 
economically worse-off children are more likely to receive support from their parents, which 
supports for the notion of an altruistic motive (Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff 1997; McGarry 
1999). Adult children in relative economic hardship should therefore be more likely to receive 
monetary support from their parents than those less in need of support. We expect that 
children who are students or unemployed are more likely to receive monetary support from 
their parents than employed children.  
Additionally, we draw upon the evidence that needs differ by life-course stage to 
hypothesise the conditions under which adult children are likely to be in more or less need of 
monetary support from their parents (Cooney and Uhlenberg 1992). As adult children with 
young children of their own are more in need of support than those without children 
(Eggebeen and Hogan 1990), we expect that having a child increases an adult child’s 
likelihood of receiving monetary support. It has also been shown that financial transfers to 
children living in the same household are less frequent and on average lower than transfers to 
children living outside the household (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993). Household income and 
assets can benefit all its members, and co-resident adult children generally receive various 
forms of material support – if not direct money transfers. Co-resident adult children are thus 
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expected to be less likely to receive money transfers from their parents compared to children 
living outside the household and who do not have access to the material benefits of the 
parents’ household.  
Resources 
Parents’ concerns about their children’s material welfare are necessarily modulated by their 
concerns about their own financial wellbeing (Becker 1974). Indeed, differences in parental 
wealth are to a large extent responsible for variations in the pattern of financial transfers 
(Albertini, Kohli and Vogel 2007; Berry 2008; McGarry 1999). Wealthy parents have more 
resources to redistribute, and are thus better able to support their children. We therefore 
expect that parents with higher income are more likely to provide monetary support to their 
adult children.  
Future reciprocity 
If the decision to provide monetary support is entirely explained by altruistic motives, one 
might expect that the incomes of the parents and the children would be the main determinants, 
but scholars agree that there are other influences (Cox 2003), which include expectations of 
future reciprocity (Cox 1987; Künemund 2008). Parents may be more inclined to support the 
child who is most likely to return a favour in the long run.  Another factor is that geographical 
proximity facilitates the exchange of practical or instrumental support and care (De Jong 
Gierveld and Fokkema 1998; Litwak and Kulis 1987), and children living nearby have more 
contact with parents than those living further away (van Gaalen, Dykstra and Flap 2008). 
Parents will thus expect that if in the future they need support, it is most likely to be provided 
by the children that live nearby. Moreover, parents will have better information about the 
needs of proximate children than those who live farther away. Both explanations lead to the 
hypothesis that children living near to their parents are more likely to receive monetary 
support from their parents than those living at greater distances.  
 7 
Providing support to biological children is a more certain investment than support to 
non-biological children. Reciprocal support exchanges are less apparent with step-children 
than with own children. In the step-families formed following divorce or separation and 
remarriage, the future relationship with step-children is uncertain. The likelihood of divorce 
or separation is greater for ever-divorced individuals compared to never-divorced individuals 
(Haskey 1996; Kalmijn 2007). Moreover, from a biological perspective, people have more 
interest in investing in the survival of their own genes, so called inclusive fitness (Hamilton 
1964). Consistent with this perspective, it has been shown that step-parents support step-
children less than biological parents, and that they support their biological children more 
(Whyte 1994). Step-parents often have biological children of their own, and when choosing 
between the two, they prefer to support biological children. We therefore expect that adult 
children with only biological parents are more likely to receive monetary support than those 
with a step-parent.  
Many women act as kin-keepers within families (Rosenthal 1985). In general, they are 
more active and assiduous than men in contacting other relatives, arranging visits, marking 
birthdays and so on, and daughters tend to help needy elderly parents with household tasks 
and personal care more than sons (Cloïn and Hermans 2006; Dwyer and Coward 1991). Given 
the gender imbalance in support provision, we assume that parents will expect more future 
support from daughters than from sons. This leads to the hypothesis that daughters are more 
likely to receive monetary support from their parents than sons.  
Alternative expenditure  
The composition of contemporary families is changing as a consequence of socio-
demographic processes that pose particular challenges to intergenerational solidarity. One 
challenge is the emergence of vertical family structures, with more generations alive at the 
same time and fewer members of each generation (Harper 2006; Saraceno 2008; Uhlenberg 
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1993; Walker 1996). In multiple generation families, the middle generation lies between at 
least two potential generations that can be recipients of support. As noted earlier, comparative 
research has shown that net support flows from older to younger generations, but the middle 
generation may still support members of both the preceding and following generations 
(Grundy and Henretta 2006). We expect that because support provisions are limited by finite 
resources, and because more extant generations imply more potential recipients of support, 
when both grandchildren and own parents are alive, this lessens the likelihood that children 
receive support.  The circumstances of the parents may also require alternative spending. 
Parents in bad health may have treatment and care expenses and thus fewer resources to 
transfer to their children (McGarry 1999; Schoeni 1997). We expect that when at least one 
parent has bad health, an adult child will be less likely to receive a financial transfer. 
Welfare states 
Because our theoretical model explicitly focuses on the characteristics of both parents and 
children, we wished to formulate hypotheses about the influence of the welfare state that refer 
to both generations. This required close consideration of how the welfare state benefits the old 
and the young, and how this may influence intergenerational monetary transfers.  The classic 
assumption underlying support provision for the needy is that the welfare state and the family 
substitute one for the other (Etzoni 1993; Wolfe 1989). The ‘crowding-out’ hypothesis posits 
that in generous welfare states, support for the needy has shifted from the family to the public 
sphere (Künemund and Rein 1999). By extension, in countries with generous welfare policies, 
family members would feel less obliged to support economically-needy relatives, since the 
state has largely taken over this function that once was the role of the family. Interestingly, 
however, there is hardly any empirical support for this position. On the contrary, scholars 
have suggested that generous welfare states enhance the likelihood that older people 
financially support their children, no least because in countries with generous welfare systems 
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older people have more resources to redistribute (Künemund and Rein 1999; Künemund 
2008; Motel-Klingebiel, Tesch-Römer and Von Kondratowitz 2005). This contradiction 
between presumption and practice may arise from the rather narrow definition of what 
welfare-state support entails. Research on the crowding-out hypothesis has tended to define 
welfare-state support as pensions and formal care for frail older people, and has rarely 
considered state transfers to other age groups. For that reason, we will examine if the patterns 
of intergenerational money transfers differ by whether the recipient of welfare support is the 
parent or the child.  
From the child’s perspective, one would expect that greater welfare support for 
children would decrease their need for support from parents. Other things being equal, 
children receiving assistance from the state must be less in need of support from family 
members than those not receiving. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994) showed that children’s 
receipt of welfare provisions associated with decreased monetary support from parents to their 
children, but the magnitude of the effect was small. We expect that unemployed children in 
countries with generous unemployment benefits are less in need and therefore less likely to 
receive monetary support from their parents than children in countries with less generous 
welfare benefits. Moreover, we hypothesise that adult children with children of their own 
living in countries with generous child-care support are less likely to receive financial 
transfers from their parents. Support for these hypotheses would be consistent with the 
crowding-out hypothesis.  
From the parents’ perspective, we expect that the greater the welfare state’s support of 
their own age group, the more likely they are to support their children. There is evidence that 
public transfers to older people are partly channelled as monetary support to their children 
(Kohli 1999; Reil-Held 2006). We therefore expect that in countries with generous public 
pension systems, retired parents are more likely to transfer money to their children than 
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retired parents in countries with less generous public pension systems. This is contrary to the 
crowding-out hypothesis, since the expectation is that a more generous welfare state actually 
increases support between parents and children. 
To formulate detailed hypotheses about country differences in welfare generosity, we 
use national statistics on child-care support for working parents, unemployment benefits and 
old-age pensions. We focus on these three aspects because of their clear links with a person’s 
financial status. Insofar as country differences exist, we formulate specific hypotheses on how 
the support received by adult children is expected to vary. Table 1 shows three types of 
welfare provision in the 10 European countries ranked in order of generosity. Child-care 
support is measured as the number of weeks of remunerated leave available to (working) 
parents with children aged less than three years in 2003: the data are from Saraceno and Keck 
(2008). We believe that this measure of the generosity of child-care support is a good 
indicator of the degree to which governments seek to maintain parents’ income when a child 
is born and support their continued participation in the labour market. Alternative indicators, 
such as parental or child allowances, differ markedly by family type and are difficult to 
standardise (Saraceno and Keck 2008). Single parent families, for example, receive much 
higher benefits in Sweden than in Austria, whereas this is not the case for two-parent families. 
Information on expenditure on old-age and unemployment benefits was taken from the 
Eurostat (2008) database and has been computed as a percentage of gross domestic product 
(GDP) in 2004 
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
Note in Table 1 that the levels of generosity of the provisions are similar in some 
countries and considerably different in others. For instance, The Netherlands, Greece, Italy 
and Spain have rather similar spending on old-age pensions but much less than in Denmark, 
Sweden and Austria. The country rank orders for the three types of provisions differ, which 
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underscores the need to separate transfers to older and younger age groups. We expect that 
welfare provisions influence monetary transfers from parents to children, and more 
specifically that children who are recipients of child-care provisions and unemployment 
benefits have a lower likelihood of receiving parental support in the most generous welfare 
states. Likewise, we expect that children whose parents receive a pension have a greater 
chance of receiving parental support in the most generous welfare states.  
In testing the hypotheses, The Netherlands is designated as the reference country. To 
limit the number of detailed hypotheses, they have been formulated only for the countries at 
the extremes of the rank orders in Table 1. We expect that adult children in The Netherlands 
with young children of their own are more likely to receive support from their parents 
compared to those in Belgium and Denmark, but less likely than those in Italy and Greece. 
For unemployed adult children, we expect that those in Sweden and Germany are especially 
unlikely to receive monetary support from their parents. Finally, we expect that adult children 
of retired parents in Denmark, Sweden and Austria are more likely to receive monetary 
support than those in The Netherlands.  
Methods 
Sample 
The data are from the first wave (release 2.01) of the Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE) collected in 2004 (Börsch-Supan and Jürges 2005). This 
wave compiled a sample of individuals aged 50 or more years in a number of European 
countries. The sampling design was not uniform for all the countries; some used samples of 
individuals and some samples of households. In both cases, however, all household members 
aged 50 or more years were invited for interview. The data therefore contain information on 
both parents of the child if they lived in the same household. The average household response 
rate was 55 per cent. The data for The Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Germany, France, 
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Sweden, Denmark, Spain, Italy, and Greece were analysed. These countries represent several 
regions of the continent but not Eastern Europe. Two surveyed countries were not included, 
Israel and Switzerland, in both cases because of a lack of comparative data on welfare 
provisions. The number of parents in the analysis sample ranged from 947 in Denmark to 
2,006 in Belgium, and the number of children for which there are data is 32,758, and they had 
17,050 parents in the sample? 
 The respondents provided detailed information for up to four of their children. If the 
primary respondent had more than four children, those aged 18 or more years were selected 
first. If the respondent had more than four children aged 18 and over, the ones living closest 
by were selected. In the case of proximity ties, the oldest children were selected, and if there 
were identical birth years, a random selection was made. Since only four children were 
selected, the observed number of transfers may be under-estimated in families with more 
extant children (but this applied to only four per cent of the respondents, with a range from 
1.3 per cent in Greece to 6.2 per cent in Spain). We selected all children aged 18 or more 
years. 
The measures  
The dependent variable was measured from the responses to the question, ‘Not counting any 
shared housing or shared food, have you [or] [your] [husband/wife/partner] given any 
financial or material gift or support to any person inside or outside this household amounting 
to €250 or more (in the local currency)?’  If the parent had provided support to a child, the 
particular child who received the support was identified, which enabled characteristics of both 
the child and the parent(s) to be incorporated in the analysis.  The needs of the child were 
measured by labour-force status and life-course stage. Since the data do not provide a direct 
measure of the child’s income or ‘ability to make ends meet’, we used labour-force status as 
an indirect measure of the financial needs of the child. Three dummy variables were created 
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to indicate whether the child was: (a) unemployed, (b) in vocational (re)training, or (c) a 
homemaker. Part-time or full-time employed children were the reference category. To restrict 
the number of labour-force categories, we excluded adult children who were already retired 
and those who were permanently sick or disabled (3% of all children).  Analyses not reported 
showed that including these groups did not affect the results, nor were the dummy variables 
representing these categories significant. A dummy variable for whether the child lived in the 
parental household was also created. 
The indicator for the parents’ resources is whether the household is ‘able to make ends 
meet’. Although income was collected by SHARE, the number of missing values was high. 
We decided not to use imputed income because the theoretical model assumes that parents 
only provide monetary support to children when they have sufficient resources to distribute, 
so the indicator of whether parents could ‘make ends meet’ is a more appropriate measure 
than income itself. Two dummy variables measured household resources: one indicates 
‘difficulty’ with making ends meet, and the other that ends were met ‘fairly easily’ (the 
reference category). Parents’ employment status was measured by two dummy variables 
indicating whether: at least one living parent was employed; and that at least one living parent 
was retired. In the case of a single parent, the reference category is parents who are 
unemployed, a homemaker or permanently sick or disabled. When both parents were alive, 
the reference category is that both were unemployed, or a homemaker, or permanently sick or 
disabled. In cases where both parents were alive and one was employed and the other retired, 
they were coded into the retired dummy.  
The three indicators of future reciprocity were constructed as follows. Distance to the 
parents was measured by creating a set of dummy variables to indicate whether the child lived 
within specified distances up to 25 kilometres, or further away. The reference category was 
living within one kilometre and included living in the same building but not the same 
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household. A dummy variable was created to denote whether one of the child’s parents (of 
either the respondent or his/her partner) was a step-parent. No children in the sample had only 
step-parents; they all had at least one biological parent. The gender of the child was measured 
by a dummy variable for female or not. 
 A number of variables measured the need for alternative expenditures. To represent 
the generational structure of the family, dummy variables were created for: (a) either parent 
having a living parent, viz. a grandparent of the child, (b) whether the parent(s) had 
grandchildren other than those belonging to the adult child respondent, (c) the interaction 
between the (a) and (b) dummy variables. The health of both parents was measured by the 
respondents’ self-evaluations of their health on a five-point scale. The dummy variable 
represents situations where one of the parents has indicated that their health was ‘bad’ or 
‘very bad’.  
 A number of control variables for both the parent and the child were used. At the 
parental level, we included level of education, which was coded using the International 
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) from 1997. Three levels were distinguished: 
(a) very little or no education (pre-primary education, primary education or first stage of basic 
education, and lower secondary or second stage of basic education), (b) intermediate levels of 
education (secondary education, and post-secondary non-tertiary education), and (c) high 
level of education (first stage of tertiary education, and second stage of tertiary education).  
The intermediate level was the reference category. As levels of education of both parents were 
correlated quite strongly (r = 0.60), we used the level of the more educated parent. We 
excluded respondents who were not classified in any of the pre-defined ISCED categories, 
which amounted to less than one per cent of all parents. Excluding these parents did not affect 
the results. The final control variable at the parental level indicated whether the household 
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sending the transfers had two parents. At the level of the child, we controlled for age, with a 
variable centred at the mean.  
The analyses 
The unit of analysis is the parent-child assemblage. As indicated before, we assumed that 
transfer decisions are made by the parental couple (when still together), not by individual 
parents. By using multilevel logistic models with random effects at the parental level, we 
accounted for the clustering of children by parents. Since there were insufficient countries to 
include these as a third level of analysis, The Netherlands was taken as the reference category 
and dummies for each of the other countries were included. To test the hypothesised influence 
of welfare-state provisions on individual support, we created terms for the interactions 
between individuals likely to receive welfare support and the country dummies. When 
significant, these indicate that children in the given country and in the given situation (has 
children/unemployed/with pensioned parents) were more or less likely to receive support from 
their parents compared to their peers in The Netherlands. To support the hypothesis that 
differences in welfare regimes shape intergenerational transfers at the dyadic level, the 
interactions would have be ranked in a similar order to those of welfare generosity as in 
Table 1. The model thus incorporates random intercepts only at the level of parents. The 
country hypotheses were tested by using fixed effects, not random effects. 
The results 
Before detailing the results, it should be noted that the majority of children did not receive 
financial support from their parents, and that the calibrated model therefore predicts a 
phenomenon that is comparatively rare. While some of the effects are rather large, it should 
also be remembered that odds ratios (OR) indicate the relative probability of receiving 
support given the specified characteristics, not the actual probability. In the following 
account, both the predicted OR and the predicted actual probability are on occasion reported.  
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As a final clarification, although the model accounts for national differences in the 
composition of the analysis sample, it does not indicate the nature of the compositional 
differences. We therefore begin the results section with an overview of the country 
differences in the dependent variable and in needs, resources and alternative expenditures.  
Monetary transfers 
Figure 1 presents for each of the 10 countries the percentage of children who received 
financial support from their parents, and the percentage of parents who provided monetary 
support to at least one child. The former percentage is a measure of the proportion of all adult 
children that received financial support, and the latter a measure of the proportion of all 
parental couples that provided financial support to any of their children. Children in Spain 
(4%) were by far the least likely to receive support, and those in Italy (11%) the second least 
likely – its percentage is closer to that of all the mid-continental European countries except 
Germany) than to the figure for Spain. At the other extreme, Sweden clearly stands out as the 
country with the highest proportion (23%) of children that received support. Among the 
intermediate cases, in Greece a much higher proportion of children (17%) received support 
than in the other southern European countries.   
< Insert Figure 1 about here > 
The variations in the percentage of parents that supported their children have a similar 
pattern. The difference in the percentages that receive and give were greatest in countries 
where the number of children per family is relatively high, such as Spain and Italy (Figure 1). 
In these countries in 2004, it appears that parents were more inclined to support only some of 
their children, whereas in countries such as Sweden with smaller family sizes, a higher 
proportion of the available children were supported. This difference is itself a case for 
considering needs and resources in models of the factors that determine which child receives 
support. These descriptive findings also suggest that clustering countries using welfare regime 
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typologies (as discussed earlier) will miss important facets of the actual variations (or 
similarities). Consider, for example, the Southern Europe cluster. The differences in the 
percentages of parents that give financial support to their children in Greece (25%), Italy 
(18%) and Spain (8%) were large. Moreover, the large difference between Greece and Spain, 
and the small differences between Greece and most of the other countries, justify neither a 
focus on differences between clusters nor ignoring the differences within clusters.  At least 
with respect to intergenerational transfers, the within-regime differences were as great as the 
between-regime differences.   
Needs 
As depicted in Figure 2, the majority of adult children in all countries were employed in 2004. 
At the extremes were Greece (74%) and Belgium (86%)m and there were considerable 
differences as between full-time and part-time employment. Especially in The Netherlands 
and to a lesser extent in Austria, many of the adult children were employed part-time. Note 
that full-time employees and part-time employees were not distinguished in the analyses. 
Given that part-time employment is often a conscious decision, rather than a response to a 
shortage of full-time jobs, we assume that all those that were employed had a similar and 
relatively low level of financial needs.  Although there were national differences in the 
prevalence of the not-employed (or economically inactive) children, the greatest variations 
were in the constituent categories. For the unemployed, the lowest prevalence (3%) was in 
Austria, whereas the greatest (8%) was in Greece. Students varied more, from two per cent of 
the adult children in Belgium to nine per cent in Sweden and Denmark. The representation of 
homemakers also had substantial variation, from around four per cent in Denmark, Sweden 
and Belgium to around 11-12 per cent in Greece, Italy, and Spain. Austria, Germany, The 
Netherlands and France had intermediate values (around 8%). As Figure 3 shows, almost 30 
per cent of adult children lived in their parents’ household in Italy, Spain, and Greece. At the 
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other extreme were Sweden and Denmark, where only two per cent lived in the same 
household. About 10 per cent of adult children lived with their parents in Belgium, Austria, 
The Netherlands, and Germany.  
< Insert Figure 2 about here > 
< Insert Figure 3 about here > 
Resources 
Compared to children’s needs, parents’ resources showed more variation among the countries. 
Figure 4 shows substantial differences in the ability of the parents’ households to make ends 
meet. Hardship was most prevalent in Greece, Italy and Spain, as more than 60 per cent of all 
parents reported ‘difficulty’ with household expenses, and only around 10 per cent that they 
‘easily got by’. By contrast, in The Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark, only 20 per cent of 
the parents reported that their households had ‘difficulty getting by’, and around 40 per cent 
reported that they ‘easily made ends meet’. The parental households in France, Belgium, 
Germany and Austria were in intermediate positions, with from 23 to 38 per cent having 
trouble making ends meet.  
< Insert Figure 4 about here > 
Future reciprocity and alternative expenditures 
Figure 3 shows substantial national differences in the distances between the parents’ and their 
adult children’s homes. In Italy, Spain, and Greece, almost 20 per cent lived within one 
kilometre, whereas in Sweden and Denmark only eight per cent were that close and a large 
majority of children lived a considerable distance from their parents – almost 50 per cent were 
more than 25 kilometres away. Belgium, France, Austria, The Netherlands and Germany had 
a similar level of geographical separation, with 10-15 per cent living within one kilometre and 
the great majority more than one kilometre apart.  
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The indicators of alternative expenditures are presented in Table 2. The percentage of 
parents with other grandchildren varied between 36 per cent in Greece and 37 per cent in Italy 
to 51 per cent in Denmark. The number of parents with both grandchildren and at least one 
living parent was low, varying between two per cent in Greece, Germany, Spain and Italy, to 
seven per cent in France. Having a household member in bad health also varied among the 
countries, The Netherlands’ parent respondents having the lowest (6%), and Italy (17%) and 
Spain (19%) the highest.  
< Insert Table 2 about here > 
The explanatory results 
The descriptive results have shown substantial differences among the countries, especially in 
parents’ resources and requirements for alternative expenditures, but it has not yet been 
established if and how these compositional differences account for the observed differences in 
parent-to-child money transfers. A model that included only the country dummies will be 
discussed when differences between the countries are examined, but first we present the 
results of the model of how the child’s and parents’ characteristics influenced the support 
received by the child. Later we assess whether the national differences in individual-level 
transfers can be linked to welfare-state generosity.  Since we use multilevel logistic regression 
models, a single measure of model fit is not available. To indicate the contribution of the 
included independent variables, we compare the model using only the intercepts for the 
different countries to the full model. The results indicate that our full model significantly 
reduced the model’s log likelihood (Likelihood ratio χ2 (22 degrees of freedom) = 1,694; 
p<0.001).  
< Insert Table 3 about here > 
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Needs 
The support received was clearly related to the child’s needs (Table 3). With employed 
children as the reference category, the odds of receiving support were 3.8 times greater if a 
child was unemployed, and 5.3 if the child was a student. Being a homemaker did not increase 
the odds of receiving financial support. The odds of receiving a financial transfer were five 
times smaller if a child co-resided with the parents, compared to when he or she lived within 
one kilometre, all else equal. These results clearly illustrate the strong influence of a child’s 
needs on the likelihood of receiving a transfer. Finally, an adult child with at least one child of 
their own moderately increased the likelihood that she or he received financial support 
(OR=1.2). 
Resources 
The resources of the parent were also important predictors of money transfers. Compared to 
the parents who reported that their household got by financially fairly easily, having a parent 
that reported that they got by easily increased the odds of a child receiving monetary support 
by 2.6, but if the parent said the household had difficulty, the odds were 3.3 times smaller. 
This clearly shows that, holding all other variables constant, the odds of a child receiving a 
transfer were highly dependent on how readily the parental household could make ends meet. 
The employment or economic activity status of the parents was also influential, even after 
taking the household’s ability to make ends meet into account. Compared to the reference 
case of the parent or both parents not working, if both parents were employed the odds of 
receiving a transfer were 2.2 times higher. If either parent was retired, the odds of receiving a 
transfer were 1.6 times higher. Although the evidence about the resources available to the 
parents is indirect, these findings indicate that children are more likely to receive financial 
transfers when their parents are in economically stable situations such as employment or 
retirement. 
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Future reciprocity 
For those not living in the parents’ home, the odds of receiving a financial transfer were 1.3 
times lower if they lived more than one kilometre away from their parents. Adult children 
with a step-parent were considerably less likely to have received financial support than those 
without step-parents. Their odds of receiving a transfer were 2.5 times lower compared to 
those with only one or both biological parents. The results also show that daughters were 
somewhat more likely to receive support compared to sons (OR = 1.2). 
Alternative expenditures 
It was also found that in cases where at least one of the parents had a serious health concern, 
the odds of receiving monetary support were 1.7 times lower. If the parent had grandchildren 
other than those of the child respondent, the odds of receiving a financial transfer were 2.5 
times lower. Whether the child’s parents had a living parent did not significantly influence the 
likelihood that a child received monetary support, nor did the parents having both 
grandchildren and a living parent.  
Control variables 
With increasing age, children were less likely to receive support: the odds of receiving a 
transfer reduced 1.1 times for each year of age. The odds of receiving a transfer were also 
strongly influenced by the parents’ level of education. Children with highly-educated parents 
had a 2.1 times higher odds compared to those with medium-educated parents, and those 
whose parents had a low level of education were much less likely to receive a transfer 
(OR=0.40). If the child still had two (or more) step or biological parents, the odds of receiving 
a transfer were 1.7 times larger compared to a child with only one biological parent.  
Differences between countries 
The descriptive results have confirmed that the countries differ considerably in terms of 
pertinent socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the sample, in other words 
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that composition effects are likely to be important. Table 4 presents the comparison between 
the intercept-only model and the full model, and shows that the compositional differences 
from The Netherlands had a considerable effect on the model explanation for the Southern 
European countries. Adult children in Spain, where levels of monetary transfers were lowest, 
were much more likely to receive support.  In the intercept-only model, the odds (0.07) were 
10 times lower, but after taking the compositional differences into account the disadvantage 
reduced to 3.3 times lower (OR=0.25). The most influential factors were co-residence with 
the parent and the parents’ household having difficulty in making ends meet. Put another way, 
if we consider the odds of not receiving a transfer, the odds changed from a factor of ten to 
three when taking the composition of the Spanish and Dutch samples into account. Although 
compositional differences do not fully explain the difference between Spain and The 
Netherlands, they substantially reduced the difference in odds of receiving financial support. 
For adult children in Italy, the effect of the compositional differences was to alter the 
intercept-only prediction that they were less likely (OR=0.47) to receive monetary support 
than those in The Netherlands, to a prediction that they were more likely to be recipients 
(OR=2.02). Among adult children in Greece, the compositional effects markedly raised the 
likelihood of receiving money transfers (OR=4.6). The differences between adult children in 
the other countries and The Netherlands produced only modest compositional effects, but 
interestingly in Denmark and Germany the full model reduced the odds of receiving money 
transfers (see Table 4). 
< Insert Table 4 about here > 
Probability of receiving support 
The results presented to this point indicate the probability of an adult child having received 
monetary support given a certain characteristic, relative to children without the characteristic. 
For example, unemployed children were more likely to receive monetary support than 
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employed children controlling for other predictors. However, the absolute likelihood of 
receiving support depended on whether they, for example, had a child, lived in the household 
of their parents or not, and had parents who could make ends meet easily. Consider a 
hypothetical child who is unemployed, has at least one child, does not live in the household 
and has parents who make ends meet easily. This child had an estimated probability of 0.11 of 
receiving monetary support from his or her parents. A child with exactly the opposite 
characteristics – employed, no children, and co-resident in the parents’ household that had 
difficulty making ends meet – had an estimated zero probability (0.0) of receiving monetary 
support. It has also been shown that receiving support was also highly dependent on the 
country of residence. The first hypothetical child has a probability of 0.01 of receiving 
support in Spain, but 0.26 in Sweden, and in the other countries the probabilities were: The 
Netherlands (0.08), Belgium (0.09), France (0.09), Italy (0.11), Denmark (0.14), Austria 
(0.16), Germany (0.18), and Greece (0.25).  
Test of the welfare-state influence 
The question remains if the differences among the countries not explained by the micro-level 
model can be attributed to differences in welfare-state provisions. To test this hypothesis, we 
added terms to the model for the interactions between each country dummy and the indicators 
of whether the child was unemployed or had children of their own, and whether the parents 
were pensioned. Hardly any significant interaction effects were found, but in Belgium and 
Austria adult children who had children of their own were significantly more likely to receive 
financial support than their counterparts in The Netherlands (OR=2.4). The effect for 
respondents in Austria was expected, but not that in Belgium. Taken the two effects together, 
and considering the absence of any other significant difference between these particular 
countries, we reject the proposition that differences in welfare-state generosity in child-care 
support explain the difference in parental support. Neither do we find significant differences 
 24 
in the likelihood of receiving support from retired parents across countries. Given the 
different pension systems in Europe, we expected adult children in Sweden, Austria and 
Denmark to be significantly more likely to receive support from their pensioned parents than 
those in The Netherlands. Because of the very low number of unemployed adult children in 
the various countries, we cannot reliably report coefficients for the interaction terms with the 
countries. While some of the estimated coefficients were significant, the very low numbers of 
unemployed children led to implausibly high odds ratios. These not reported results were not 
in line with differences in generosity between the countries as reported in Table 1.  
Additional analyses were run to determine whether the specification of the model was 
responsible for the lack of significant results. First of all, we changed the reference category 
from The Netherlands, a country with rather average welfare provisions, to countries at the 
extremes. Neither the use of Denmark (with one of the most generous welfare-state 
provision), nor Greece (one of the least generous) as reference categories resulted in any other 
significant interactions.  We investigated whether the lack of significant results was 
attributable to the inclusion of the dummy variable representing the easiness of difficulty in 
making ends meet. The reasoning behind the welfare-state influencing intergenerational 
solidarity is that differences in the generosity of pension systems create greater means for 
pensioned parents to transfer funds to their children in some countries than others, but 
excluding the dummy variables for making ends meet did not change the significance of the 
interactions. The only notable change that we found was with the indicators of the parents’ 
employment status. In the model where making ends meet was not used, the coefficients for 
parents who were employed or retired were considerably higher compared to the model where 
making ends meet was included (not shown). This is of course caused by the fact that 
employed and retired parents are in general much more able to make ends meet than parents 
who fall in the unemployed, homemaker or disabled category. Not including the dummy 
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variables for making ends meet transfers part of the effects to the employment status 
indicators. 
Discussion 
This paper has examined financial transfers from parents to their adult children in 10 
European countries in 2004 using a twofold approach. Firstly, we tested a theoretical model 
which incorporated micro-level determinants of support provision (money transfers) by 
parents and of receipts by children. This model was based on explicit expectations about the 
role of the child’s and the parents’ needs and resources, including the parents’ need to make 
alternative expenditures, and the parents’ expectations of future reciprocal support. We then 
used this model to test whether differences in welfare-state generosity associated with 
systematic national differences in the patterns of transfers from parents to their children. To 
test the micro-level hypotheses, we used multilevel models to account for the nesting of 
children to parents. We controlled for country-level differences by using fixed-effects at the 
country level. The test of welfare-state influence was performed by identifying pensioned 
parents and adult children with children of their own or who were unemployed, viz. those who 
are prone to receive state support. Differences in generosity between welfare systems were 
hypothesised to result in differences between countries in the likelihood of financial transfers, 
especially from pensioned parents and to unemployed children and children with children of 
their own.  
At the individual level, the findings have revealed the importance of considering both 
the child’s characteristics and the parental context. The child’s needs were an important 
predictor of transfer receipt. Children more in need of financial support – as indicated by 
employment status – were considerably more likely to have received support from their 
parents. Children living in the parental household were least likely to have received financial 
support. Adult children who lived more than one kilometre away from the parents were less 
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likely to have received monetary support, but considerably more so than those living inside 
the household. It was also found that adult children with children of their own were more 
likely to have received support, although this likelihood was attenuated when other siblings 
also had children of their own. The results also confirm our expectation that the parents’ 
resources have a strong influence on whether they are able to provide monetary support. 
Parents that had alternative expenditures had a lower likelihood of making transfers to 
children. Daughters were more likely to receive transfers than sons, and step-children were 
less likely to receive support compared to biological children – both these findings are in line 
with the reasoning that expectations of future reciprocity influence the likelihood of transfers 
to adult children. We also found that in families where at least one of the parents was in poor 
health, adult children were less likely to receive monetary support from their parents.  
 In contrast to earlier comparative empirical work on support provision between parents 
and children in Europe, we chose not to cluster countries by welfare regimes (Albertini, Kohli 
and Vogel 2007). Although this hampers the ability to compare our findings with those of 
previous research, we argue that examining individual countries provides more nuanced 
insights into macro-level differences and how they are translated at the micro-level. The 
variations in the aggregate level of financial support from parents to adult children among the 
10 countries have shown that, on the whole, within cluster differences are just as large as 
between cluster differences. When the considerable compositional differences between 
countries were taken into account, the differences in the likelihood of support receipt were 
reduced, and those that remained are not consistent with the three commonly-used welfare 
regimes. Furthermore, we have not found evidence that the generosity of the welfare-state 
consistently influences the likelihood of transfer receipt by specific groups of children. The 
likelihoods of receipts from retired parents did not differ across the countries, and the same 
applied to adult children who received child-care support from the state.  
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Without clear evidence of the influence of state provisions on financial transfers from 
parents to children, statements regarding the crowding-out effect for material support seem 
superfluous (if and how ‘crowding out’ pertains to personal care and instrumental support is 
another question). Our results suggest that state support does not substitute for family support, 
for no evidence of the hypothesised link has been found. This result is rather surprising given 
that previous scholarly work has shown that intergenerational support follows patterns of 
regime typologies, although part of the evidence considers time transfers, which we do not 
address (Albertini, Kohli and Vogel 2007). Irrespective of the type of transfers condiered, 
previous empirical work on the link between the family and the state, by focusing on 
aggregate patterns has lacked an explicit test. Our direct test of the hypothesised influence has 
not found support for these previous findings, and suggests that the similarities between 
countries are not bounded by geographical region. This also seems to rule out the cultural 
explanation for the differences between countries proposed by Reher (1998). His notion of 
strong and weak family ties is not reflected in the reported patterns of monetary support. After 
taking into account compositional differences, support was highest in Sweden and Greece, 
exemplars of countries with respectively weak and strong family ties. The lack of country-
level variation in our results may have resulted from the use of dummy variables to capture 
country differences. The inclusion of more and more sensitive measures of particular aspects 
of each country’s welfare-state arrangements would be an improvement. This kind of analysis 
requires a much larger number of countries, since with just ten cases multilevel modelling at 
the country level is not an option. An alternative would be to include measures of welfare-
state support at the individual level, but we are not aware that such data exists.  
The descriptive results also reveal marked differences among the countries in the 
levels of household wealth. At the individual level, the analysis showed that parents hardly 
ever send money when they have difficulty making ends meet. Only when money is of no 
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concern did they support their children financially. Combining the descriptive and analytical 
results makes clear that aggregate differences in welfare-state spending go hand-in-hand with 
differences in individual incomes by country. Hence, aggregate differences among the 
countries in monetary transfers to a certain degree reflect levels of relative wealth. In families 
where wealth is a limiting factor, one expects that filial responsibility is fulfilled in other 
ways, for example, by investing time. Time transfers are perhaps not independent of money 
but rather a substitute in cases where monetary means are lacking. This may be a possible 
explanation for why the patterns are not in line with different welfare-state arrangements. 
Previous research has described differences between countries in the provision of money and 
time transfers (Albertini, Kohli and Vogel 2007). Time transfers are more common in 
Southern European countries than elsewhere in Europe, suggesting that they substitute for 
money transfers. We have attempted to take non-monetary transfers into account, at least 
partially, by including an indicator for whether adult children still live in the parental 
household (Tomassini et al. 2004). Future research may be able to provide insight into the 
dynamics between different forms of transfers by incorporating other non-monetary forms of 
support into the models.  
 This close examination of the ten European countries for which there were sufficient 
data has unavoidably overlooked other European countries, and regrettably none of the 
countries in ‘New Europe’ were represented. Eastern European countries are not a 
homogenous set with either a common socio-demographic composition or uniform welfare 
policies. They have recently undergone major welfare policy changes (Adukaite 2009), 
making them a particularly interesting for further study. Extending the scope of research on 
intergenerational transfers would provide new insights into the micro and macro-level 
influences and dynamics.  
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TABLE 1.  The ranked generosity of three types of welfare provisions, 10 European countries 2004.  
Child-care support1 Unemployment2 Old-age2 
Belgium (57 weeks)  Sweden (3.5%) Denmark (3.7%) 
Denmark (56 weeks) Germany (2.8%) Sweden (2.9%) 
France (43 weeks) France (2.1%)  Austria (2.9%) 
Sweden (41 weeks) Belgium (2.0%) Germany (2.1%) 
The Netherlands (24 weeks) Italy (1.9%) Belgium (2.0%) 
Germany (10 weeks) Austria (1.6%) France (1.6%) 
Spain (10 weeks) Denmark (1.4%) The Netherlands (1.2%) 
Austria (9 weeks) The Netherlands (1.2%) Greece (1.1%) 
Italy (7 weeks) Spain (1.1%) Spain (0.8%) 
Greece (7 weeks) Greece (0.5%) Italy (0.7%) 
Notes:  1. Duration in weeks of the support for children aged less than three years in 2004.  2. Spending on the benefit as a 
percentage of gross domestic product in 2004.  
Sources: Saraceno and Keck (2008); Eurostat (2008).  
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TABLE 2. Means of variables measuring alternative expenditures and control variables per country for parents and children in our sample 
  
 Austria Germany Sweden Netherlands Spain Italy France Denmark Greece Belgium 
  
Parental characteristics: 
At least one retired 0.73 0.61 0.58 0.47 0.45 0.64 0.60 0.59 0.52 0.60 
Both working 0.14 0.22 0.35 0.22 0.16 0.14 0.23 0.31 0.16 0.19 
Either parent in bad health 0.11 0.16 0.10 0.06 0.19 0.17 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.10 
Has grandchild 0.42 0.41 0.50 0.43 0.43 0.37 0.48 0.49 0.36 0.49 
At least one living parent 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.26 0.21 0.23 0.20 
Both grandchild and grandparent 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.05 
Education: Low 0.28 0.13 0.46 0.51 0.82 0.75 0.44 0.20 0.61 0.43 
 Medium 0.48 0.58 0.30 0.25 0.08 0.19 0.33 0.44 0.24 0.28 
 High 0.24 0.29 0.24 0.24 0.09 0.05 0.22 0.36 0.15 0.29 
Two parents 0.55 0.73 0.72 0.76 0.75 0.78 0.62 0.58 0.60 0.67 
 
Child's characteristics: 
Has child 0.60 0.56 0.61 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.60 0.63 0.50 0.63 
Has step-parent 0.03 0.08 0.20 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.15 0.01 0.07 
Gender (female=1) 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.49 
Age (mean centred in analyses) 37.76 37.55 37.09 35.73 36.32 36.01 36.51 37.90 36.12 36.79 
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TABLE 3.  Odds ratios for financial transfers to children, 10 European countries, 2004 
Children  Parents 
Characteristics 
Odds 
ratios  Characteristics 
Odds 
ratios 
A. Needs and resources: 
Child’s needs:  Employed (Ref) 1.00  Making ends meet: Difficult 0.34*** 
 Unemployed 3.76***    Fairly easily (Ref) 1.00 
 Student 5.27***    Easily  2.57*** 
 Homemaker 1.00     
Adult child has child 1.22*   One or both parents working 2.18*** 
Lives with parents1 0.19***  One or both parents retired 1.59*** 
    Unemployed, homemaker or disabled (Ref) 1.00 
 
B. Expected reciprocity C. Alternative expenditures 
Distance: <1 km away (Ref) 1.00   Either parent in bad health 0.58*** 
 <25 km away 0.80*   Parent has other grandchildren 0.42*** 
 >25 km away 0.80*   At least one living parent 1.19 
Only biological parent(s) (Ref) 1.00  Grandchild and grandparent alive 1.09 
Has step-parent 0.36***    
Gender (female=1) 1.23**    
 
D. Control variables 
Age (single years) 0.93***   Education: Low 0.40*** 
      Medium (Ref) 1.00 
      High 2.11*** 
    Parental couple 1.69*** 
 
Notes:  The multilevel logistic regression model included dummy variables for the countries, and their 
effects are presented in Table 4.  Ref: reference category.  1. Living less than one kilometre from the 
parents.  The differences between the other distance categories are also significant and in the same 
direction.  
Significance levels  * p<0.05; ** p <0.01; *** p <0.001  
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TABLE 4. Comparison of the country fixed-effects for the intercept-only model and the full model.  
 Country fixed-effects (odds ratios) 
Country Intercept only  Full model 
Spain 0.07***  0.25*** 
Italy 0.47***  2.02** 
Greece 1.48*  4.63*** 
Austria 1.60**  2.12** 
Germany 2.39***  1.86** 
Netherlands (reference case) 1.00  1.00 
France 0.85  1.20 
Belgium 0.90  1.16 
Denmark 2.22***  1.65* 
Sweden 4.34***  4.12*** 
Note: The model is specified in Table 3. 
Significance levels:  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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Figure 1. Percentages of children receiving monetary support and of parents providing monetary support 
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Figure 2. Employment status of adult children in percentages 
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Figure 3. Distance of adult children to their parents in percentages 
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Figure 4. Ability to make ends meet for household of parents in percentages 
